

## A STRAND OF THOUGHT IN PINDAR, *OLYMPIANS* 7

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For many years the beautiful ode for Diagoras of Rhodes (*Olympians* 7) has attracted the attention of scholars.<sup>1</sup> Both the ode's unity and the interrelation of its parts have been examined, often with emphasis on certain images thought to be found within it.<sup>2</sup> Although such studies may isolate images present within the ode, it seems clear that no single thought or image suffices as the single key to the ode's unity.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, this ode, like others of Pindar, displays the complexity of an

<sup>1</sup> Important recent studies include the following: G. Lawall, "The Cup, the Rose and the Winds in Pindar's Seventh Olympian," *RFIC* 89 (1961) 33–47; J. H. Barkhuizen, "Structural Patterns in Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode," *Acta Classica* 11 (1968) 25–37; D. C. Young, *Three Odes of Pindar* (Leiden 1968) 69–105; O. Smith, "An Interpretation of Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode," *C&M* 28 (1969) 172–85; W. J. Verdenius, *Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode: A Commentary* (Amsterdam 1972); J. Defradas, "Διορθῶσαι λόγον: la septième Olympique," *Serta Turyniana* (Urbana 1974) 34–50; W. J. Vian, "C. R. de l'ouvrage de W. J. Verdenius, *Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode: A Commentary*," *RPh* 48 (1974) 334–35; M. M. Willcock, "Review: W. J. Verdenius: *Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode: A Commentary*," *CR* n.s. 25 (1975) 5–6; C. O. Pavese, "Le Olimpiche di Pindaro," *QUCC* 20 (1975) 65–122, esp. 97–101; B. K. Braswell, "Notes on the Prooemium to Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode," *Mnemosyne* 29 (1976) 233–42; W. J. Verdenius, "Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode, Supplementary Comments," *Mnemosyne* 29 (1976) 243–53; A. Bresson, *Mythe et Contradiction, Analyse de la VII<sup>e</sup> Olympique de Pindare* (Paris 1979); N. F. Rubin, "Olympians 7: The Toast and the Future Prayer," *Hermes* 108 (1980) 248–52; "Pindar's Creation of Epinician Symbols: *Olympians* 7 and 6," *CW* 74 (1980) 67–87, esp. 69–79; J. H. Barkhuizen, "Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode," *Acta Classica* 23 (1980) 107–10. These works will be referred to in the following paper by the author's name only. For further bibliography see: Verdenius, *Commentary* 3–4; D. E. Gerber, *Bibliography of Pindar 1513–1966* (Cleveland 1969) 30–32; "Studies in Greek Lyric Poetry: 1967–1975," *CW* 70 (1976–77) 135–43.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley 1945) 138–45; Lawall; and Young, *Three Odes* 69–105.

<sup>3</sup> For this point of view see especially the remarks in D. C. Young, "Pindaric Criticism," in *Pindaros und Bakchylides*, ed. by W. M. Calder and J. Stern (Darmstadt 1970) 4–95, and H. Lloyd-Jones, "Modern Interpretation of Pindar: The Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes," *JHS* 93 (1973) 109–37.

intricately-worked tapestry or carpet.<sup>4</sup> Many colours interwoven create a coherent whole; individually none can account for the final product with all its detail. So in *Olympians* 7 several strands of thought seem to interweave and form the complex structure of the poem. This paper will isolate one such strand that appears to run through the ode. This strand concerns *phrenes*. By reappearing in different parts of the ode, it both links these parts together and enhances the meaning of the separate mentions of *phrenes* in the poem. It thus acts as a unifying factor, although it is itself simply one of the diverse elements present within *Olympians* 7.

*Olympians* 7 begins with the lovely description of a wedding feast.<sup>5</sup> The bridegroom receives as a gift a *φιάλαν*, as the giver honours the “joy of the feast” (*συμποσίου χάριν*) and “his new son-in-law” (5).<sup>6</sup> Because of his gift, the bridegroom is an object of envy for his “harmonious marriage”: *ζαλωτὸν ὁμόφρονος εὐνᾶς* (6).<sup>7</sup> Like the father-in-law, Pindar has a gift to give: his ode for victors, *Μοισᾶν δόσιον* . . . *γλυκὺν καρπὸν φρενός* (7–10). After speaking of this gift, he makes the general remark (10–12):

ὁ δ' ὀλβιος, ὃν φᾶμαι κατέχωντ' ἀγαθαί·  
 ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλον ἐποπτεύ-  
 ει Χάρις ζωθάλμιος ἄδυμελεῖ  
 θαμὰ μὲν φόρμιγγι παμφώνοισι τ' ἐν ἔντεσιν αὐλῶν.

If “good reports” surround a man, he is *olbios*. *Charis* does not always gaze on one man only but now she attends Diagoras. He receives the *charis* of good reports, the “joy” of being well-spoken of because of his victory. This *charis* comes to him as the desired end of his athletic activity.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See B. Snell's apt description of a Pindaric ode as an “ornate tapestry” in *The Discovery of the Mind*, tr. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Oxford 1953) 83. See also Young's remarks in *Three Odes* 105 and “Pindaric Criticism” (above, note 3) 6.

<sup>5</sup> For interpretations of the opening lines of *Olympians* 7 see Norwood (above, note 2) 77 f., 144–45; Lawall 35–37; Young, *Three Odes* 69–75; Verdenius, *Commentary* 4–10; Braswell 233–42; Verdenius, *Mnemosyne* 29 (1976) 243–46; Rubin, *Hermes* 108 (1980) 248–52.

<sup>6</sup> In line 5 I follow Verdenius, *Commentary* 6, who takes *χάριν* as the object of *τιμάσας*.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Hom. *Od.* 6.182–84. For the interpretation of *ὁμόφρονος εὐνᾶς* as “harmonious marriage” I follow B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar, the Olympian and Pythian Odes* (London 1892) 185, and C. M. Bowra, *The Odes of Pindar* (Penguin 1969) 25. Contrast Braswell 240–42, who suggests the epithet refers to an agreement of mind between son-in-law and father-in-law, and Verdenius, *Mnemosyne* 29 (1976) 245, who suggests that the epithet is “purely conventional.” The description of the marriage as *ὁμόφρων* may suggest that the *phrenes* of its members or of the two families work in accord.

<sup>8</sup> Pindar mentions *charis*, “joy,” four times in this ode: lines 5, 11, 89, 93. For a more detailed discussion of its range of meaning see H. Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Frankfurt 1935) 30–76; M. Bernard, *Pindars Denken in Bildern* (Pfullingen 1963) 19 with note 25; Young, *Three Odes* 93, 97; Verdenius, *Commentary* 6–7, 9; Braswell 231–37; P. H. Schrijvers as quoted in Verdenius, *Mnemosyne* 29 (1976) 245, with Verdenius' comments 245–46; Rubin, *Hermes* 108 (1980) 250, note 5.

The song Pindar writes for Diagoras is both a “gift of the Muses” and the “sweet fruit of his *phrên*” (7–8).<sup>9</sup> Pindar’s *phrên* produces his song but at the same time this song is a divine gift. Very subtly the strand of thought that becomes more prominent in the rest of the poem emerges here. At this point we have not heard how *phrenes* can be adversely affected by *amplakiai* or disturbed by *tarachai*. The “fruit” of Pindar’s *phrên* is sweet; the contrast with Tlepolemos and the error of his *phrenes* is still to come. Here we see only that a certain product of Pindar’s *phrên*, his song, has been complemented by the presence of *charis* whose glance, sadly for man, can shift.

Pindar begins his correct version (διορθῶσαι λόγον, 21) of the myths with the story of Tlepolemos.<sup>10</sup> Before he mentions the murder of Likymnios, he makes this gnomic statement (25–26):

ἀμφὶ δ’ ἀνθρώπων φρασὶν ἀμπλακίαι  
ἀναρίθμητοι κρέμονται· τοῦτο δ’ ἀμάχανον εὐρεῖν,  
ὅτι νῦν ἐν καὶ τελευτᾷ φέρτατον ἀνδρὶ τυχεῖν.

“Around the *phrenes* of men unnumbered *amplakiai* hang. This is impossible to find: what now and in the end is best for a man to hit upon.” In some details Pindar corrects the Homeric story, clearly not in an attempt to excuse Tlepolemos for the murder but to clarify its source.<sup>11</sup> This he specifies first by his reference to φρασὶν ἀμπλακίαι ἀναρίθμητοι.

*Amplakiai* implies “error” or “faults” that involve some form of wrongdoing.<sup>12</sup> Pindar presents a physical image of man’s *phrenes* surrounded by “innumerable errors.”<sup>13</sup> The source of these *amplakiai* is not made clear but very possibly it is divine.<sup>14</sup> The effect of their presence is unavoidable: man commits errors. Whether his *phrenes* actively choose *amplakiai* or whether these somehow invade and possess them remains

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Nem.* 4.6–8. Cf. also other references to καρπὸς φρενός in *Pyth.* 2.73 and *Nem.* 10.12 and also references in *Ol.* 2.90 and *Ol.* 10.53 to *phrên* as the source of poetry.

<sup>10</sup> For the interpretation that διορθῶσαι λόγον implies a corrected version see especially Norwood (above, note 2) 258, note 3; B. A. van Groningen, *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque* (Amsterdam 1958) 354–55; Defradas 34 f., and Verdenius, *Commentary* 13 with note 40.

<sup>11</sup> For the details of Homer’s version see Young, *Three Odes* 82–83, and Verdenius, *Commentary* 13–14.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Pyth.* 2.30; 3.13; *Isth.* 6.29. For a discussion of the meaning of *amplakia* as “error” or “fault” see J. M. Bremer, *Hamartia* (Amsterdam 1969), esp. 112, 117; S. Saïd, *La faute tragique* (Paris 1978) 94; Smith 177; Defradas 40; Verdenius, *Commentary* 14.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Isth.* 2.43 and 8.14. For the physical image that Pindar’s lines suggest see R. Lattimore, *The Odes of Pindar* (Chicago 1947) 20; Young, *Three Odes* 81, 85; and Verdenius, *Commentary* 15.

<sup>14</sup> On the divine origin see especially Bremer (above, note 12); Saïd (above, note 12); Smith 176–77; and Bresson 136.

similarly unclear.<sup>15</sup> Likely here as elsewhere in the early Greek poets there is a lack of clear distinction between man as subject or object of an action. *Phrenes* within man function and yet are open to outside influences.<sup>16</sup> Man's activities thus can have a double causation.

These *amplakiai* around *phrenes* make a person vulnerable. He cannot be confident about his *phrenes* and how they function at each moment. Even so, he must still bear responsibility for his acts.<sup>17</sup> The large number of these errors also increases his difficulties: he cannot be sure in the face of so many choices that he has found "what is best both now and in the end."

Man traditionally relies on *phrenes* in making decisions.<sup>18</sup> Although his *noos* may instantly know what is best in any situation, it tends often to be hidden from him. Consequently a person must depend instead on *phrenes* which can deliberate and choose.<sup>19</sup>

This aspect of *phrenes* appears in references that Pindar makes to them elsewhere in his poems. *Phrenes* are involved in forming plans that lead to certain courses of action. Pelias trusting his white *phrenes* steals power from Jason's parents (*Pyth.* 4.109).<sup>20</sup> Achilles fixes a plan in his *phrenes* to prevent the return of Memnon (*Nem.* 3.62). *Phrên* "acts by plans" (*Nem.* 1.27).<sup>21</sup>

In another passage Pindar, describing in general the way men should act, mentions how *phrenes* are to be used (*Pyth.* 3.59–60):

χρή τὰ ἐοικότα πὰρ  
δαμόνων μαστενέμεν θναταῖς φρασίν  
γνόοντα τὸ πὰρ ποδός, οἷας εἰμὲν αἴσας.

"With mortal *phrenes* we must seek out from the gods what is appropriate, knowing what is at hand, of what sort of fate we are." This passage shows how important the gods are for man's life: they know what actions are appropriate. Man has a particular *αἴσα*: *phrenes* help him to discover what this is.

<sup>15</sup> For example, in *Pyth.* 3.13 *amplakiai* seem to arise from *phrenes*; here they surround *phrenes*.

<sup>16</sup> See the excellent remarks of Verdenius, *Commentary* 8. *Olympians* 7.7–8 illustrate this point well; this ode is both a gift of the Muses and the fruit of Pindar's *phrên*. For bibliography on man as an "open-field" see *Glotta* 57 (1979) 162, note 25.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Ol.* 8.24. Contrast Smith 178–80 and Bresson 136, who think that Tlepelepos' responsibility is reduced because of divine influence.

<sup>18</sup> On the range of activities of *phrên* see S. M. Darcus, "A Person's relation to *φρήν* in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek Lyric Poets," *Glotta* 57 (1979) 159–73.

<sup>19</sup> On the relationship between *phrên* and *noos* see S. M. Darcus, "*Noos* Precedes *Phren* in Greek Lyric Poetry," *AC* 46 (1977) 41–51.

<sup>20</sup> For an interpretation of this line see S. M. Darcus, "An Echo of Homer in Pindar, *Pythians* 4," *TAPA* 107 (1977) 17–21.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. also the reference to *μηδεα φρενῶν* (*Pae.* 9.37) and *σύνεσις φρενῶν* (*Nem.* 7.60).

But judgements with *phrên* can be hard; in *Ol.* 8.23–25 Pindar speaks of the difficulty of “judging opportunely with an upright *phrên*” a matter of great importance:

ὅτι γὰρ πολὺ καὶ πολλὰ ῥέπη  
ὀρθῶ διακρίναι φρενὶ μὴ παρὰ καιρὸν  
δυσπαλές.

In comparison with the gods, man’s *phrên* is limited (fr. 61.4):<sup>22</sup>

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ ὅπως τὰ θεῶν  
βουλεύματ’ ἐρευνάσει βροτέα φρενί.

Other problems occur with *phrenes*: they are vulnerable. Passages in the early Greek poets as well as in Pindar show that gods can harm, deceive, remove, or destroy *phrenes*; they can also fill them with daring.<sup>23</sup> Pindar speaks of honouring the *daimôn* who always attends (ἀμφέπω) his *phrenes* (*Pyth.* 3.109). Emotions especially affect *phrenes*: love,<sup>24</sup> grief, joy, and cares.<sup>25</sup> Other forces also influence them: *atê*, *kerdos*, *ponos*.<sup>26</sup> In *Olympians* 7 *amplakiai* surround *phrenes*; in other odes love, fear, and desire affect them.<sup>27</sup>

This brief summary concerning *phrenes* shows that man uses them in making decisions but that outside forces may adversely affect this process. This is what happened to Tlepolemos in *Olympians* 7: *amplakiai* surrounding his *phrenes* caused him to murder his uncle.

But this is not all we hear of the murder: Pindar gives more details. Tlepolemos acted *χολωθείς*. Pindar also says that *φρενῶν παραχαί* often have led even a wise man astray (30–31):

τᾶσδέ ποτε χθονὸς οἴκι-  
στὴρ χολωθείς. αἱ δὲ φρενῶν παραχαί  
παρέπλαγξαν καὶ σοφόν. μαντεύσατο δ’ ἐς θεὸν ἐλθών.

The anger affecting Tlepolemos either constituted or caused the disturbance (*παραχαί*) of the *phrenes*.<sup>28</sup> This impairment was all the more unfortunate because Tlepolemos was a *sophos*. Nonetheless, after the

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Bacch. fr. 11.4: δὲ μὲν ἀμφιπολεῖ φρενί.

<sup>23</sup> See, e.g., Hom. *Il.* 6.234; 7.360; 9.377; 15.724; 17.573; *Od.* 13.337; Hes. *W. & D.* 55; *Theog.* 889; fr. 69; Arch. fr. 172.2 (W).

<sup>24</sup> See, e.g. Hom. *Il.* 3.442; 14.294; Arch. fr. 191.3 (W); Sapph. fr. 47.2 (LP); *Theog.* 1388; Bacch. fr. 20B.8.

<sup>25</sup> See, e.g., Hom *Il.* 1.362; *Od.* 19.471; Sol. fr. 4a.1; *Theog.* 787; Mimn. fr. 1.7.

<sup>26</sup> Hom. *Il.* 16.805; 6.355; Bacch. fr. 1.1. Cf. also *Theog.* 387 and Bacch. 1.162.

<sup>27</sup> *Pyth.* 10.60; *Nem.* 3.39; *Ol.* 1.41. Cf. also *Pyth.* 2.26; 4.219; 6.36; 9.32.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Hom. *Il.* 4.549. *Tarachai* may suggest an inward disturbance of *phrenes*, already harrassed by *amplakiai*. The source of this disturbance may be divine (see Smith 178–80) but this does not eliminate the part Tlepolemos played in the murder. See also Verdenius, *Commentary* 15, who questions Smith’s interpretation of *tarachai*.

murder he did what was wise and consulted the god. He expiated the murder by exile.

In this ode, then, Pindar does not excuse Tlepolemos for his actions but gives details that elicit sympathy. He tells us that Tlepolemos was a victim of *amplakiai* and *tarachai*. He describes the consultation of the god after the murder and the exile. Later Tlepolemos became the founder of Rhodes, honoured among his people ὥσπερ θεός (77–80).<sup>29</sup> Something obviously not νῦν φέρτατον (the murder of his uncle) became something ἐν τελευτᾷ φέρτατον (25). Because of the change in his actions, Tlepolemos seems to have attracted the glance of *Charis*, as she is described in line 11. After a poor beginning, he won the “joy” of good reports similar to that which Diagoras now enjoys.

In the second myth this strand in *Olympians* 7 concerning *phrenes* and their influence on human behavior appears again. In describing how the Heliadae brought a sacrifice without fire for Athena Pindar says (43–47):

ἐν δ' ἀρετάν  
ἔβαλεν καὶ χάρματ' ἀνθρώποισι προμαθέος αἰδώς·  
ἐπὶ μὲν βαίνει τι καὶ λάθας ἀτέκμαρτα νέφος,  
καὶ παρέλκει πραγμάτων ὀρθὰν ὁδόν  
ἔξω φρενῶν.

Pindar first says that “respect, born of forethought, casts *aretê* and joys among men.”<sup>30</sup> This “respect” can bring success. The Heliadae evidently neglected “forethought” and therefore could not show forth the required “respect” in the sacrifice. They did not bring fire because their *phrenes* were affected by λάθα.<sup>31</sup> Forgetfulness came upon them and took the πραγμάτων ὀρθὰν ὁδόν out of sight.<sup>32</sup> Like *amplakiai*, this forgetfulness

<sup>29</sup> This pattern of a blessing following a grave error or mistake appears also in the other two myths. Pindar does not say that the error or mistake caused the blessing or that either of these was in itself a good thing. Man is simply blessed in being able to receive *charis* even after such actions have been committed. On this pattern in the ode see remarks of Young, *Three Odes* 79–81, and Verdenius, *Commentary* 14.

<sup>30</sup> I follow Verdenius in his interpretation of προμαθέος αἰδώς: *Commentary* 19. For bibliography on different interpretations of line 44 see C. von Erffa, ΑΙΔΩΣ in *Philologus Supplementband* 30.2 (1937) 78–79, and Bresson 55, note 8.

<sup>31</sup> In *Ol.* 8.59–61 Pindar says that “the *phrenes* of the inexperienced are rather foolish”; one thing they lack is “foreknowledge”:

τὸ διδάσασθαι δέ τοι  
εἰδότι ῥάτερον· ἄγνωμον δὲ τὸ μὴ προμαθεῖν·  
κουφότεραι γὰρ ἀπειράτων φρένες.

<sup>32</sup> For the image see Young, *Three Odes* 85. Here forgetfulness is described as an external force coming upon *phrenes*. See the parallels quoted by O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges* (Berlin 1937) 95, and also above notes 24–27. Contrast Hom. *Il.* 6.285 and Pind. *Pyth.* 4.4 where *phrenes* forget.

adversely affects *phrenes*. But even after they forgot the fire, the Heliadae received from Zeus and Athena special blessings in the form of golden rain and *technê*. In this myth, as with Tlepolemos, a mistake is followed by an eventual blessing.<sup>33</sup>

This strand about *phrenes* appears a third time at the end of the ode. After asking Zeus to honour Diagoras, *ἄνδρα τε πῦξ ἀρετὰν εὐρόντα* (89), Pindar makes an additional request (89–92):

δίδοι τέ οἱ αἰδοίαν χάριν  
καὶ ποτ' ἄστῶν καὶ ποτὶ ξεί-  
νων. ἐπεὶ ὕβριος ἐχθρὰν ὁδόν  
εὐθυπορεῖ, σάφα δαεῖς ἅ τε οἱ πατέρων  
ὀρθαὶ φρένες ἐξ ἀγαθῶν  
ἐχρεον.

Pindar prays that Diagoras receive *αἰδοίαν χάριν*. The *charis* here, as in line 11, is the “joy” of being well-spoken of by others, both “citizens and foreigners.” Diagoras deserves this *charis* because “he walks straight upon a road that hates *hybris*, knowing clearly what upright *phrenes* from good fathers enjoin.”

In these lines Pindar makes clear where *ὀρθαὶ φρένες* derive from. Diagoras has inherited them from “good fathers.”<sup>34</sup> As so often in his other odes, Pindar refers to the great importance that man’s nature by birth (*φύα*) has upon his behaviour. Diagoras’ “upright *phrenes*” thus far have allowed him to avoid *hybris*.<sup>35</sup> Although his ancestors’ *phrenes* proved vulnerable to *amplakiai* and *latha* and he too is susceptible to such negative forces, Diagoras’ clear knowledge of “what upright *phrenes* enjoin” so far has kept him from mistakes.<sup>36</sup>

Is this strand of thought about *phrenes* present at all in the third portion of the myth, the story of Helios? Yes, but less explicitly. Pindar

<sup>33</sup> See above note 29. See also Gildersleeve (above, note 7) 184 who notes that the fault becomes less, the blessing greater, as we move through the myths. Contrast Young, *Three Odes* 79–80, who questions the value of degrees of fault for interpreting the myths.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Isth.* 6.72. For this interpretation that *orthai phrenes* belong to Diagoras, see F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880) 447; Young, *Three Odes* 94; and Verdenius, *Commentary* 31. Note that Helios’ sons may likewise have inherited *σοφώτατα νοήματ’ ἐπὶ προτέρων ἀνδρῶν* (71–72) from their father.

<sup>35</sup> The reference to *ὀρθαὶ φρένες* in 91 may echo *πραγμάτων ὀρθὰν ὁδόν* in 46. Likewise the reference to the *ὕβριος ἐχθρὰν ὁδόν* in 90 may also echo 46. For these cross-references in the ode see Smith 183 and Vian 334. Contrast Verdenius, *Mnemosyne* 29 (1976) 251, who rejects such echoes in the ode. Further on the image of *ὁδός* in Pindar see A. M. Komornicka, “Quelques remarques sur la notion d’ΑΛΛΑΘΕΙΑ et de ΨΕΥΔΟΣ chez Pindare,” *Eos* 60 (1972) 244.

<sup>36</sup> *Δαεῖς* in line 91 echoes *δαέντι* in line 53. *Δάω*, a rare verb in Pindar, is found elsewhere only in fr. 166.1. The echo suggests that knowledge is characteristic of the people of Rhodes. For bibliography on the interpretation of the difficult line 53, see Young, *Three Odes* 86, note 2; Verdenius, *Commentary* 23; Bresson 57, notes 29, 31.

does not state clearly why Helios was absent at the allotment of lands but it appears that the gods overlooked him in his absence.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, afterwards, Helios reminds Zeus (*μνασθέντι*, 61). He asks for Rhodes, an island soon to emerge from the sea; his request becomes reality: *ἐν ἀλαθείᾳ* (68–69).<sup>38</sup>

Although there is no explicit mention of *phrenes* in this myth, the gods too, it seems, can make mistakes. But, as in the other two myths, here as well a mistake ends finally in a blessing.

These passages in *Olympians* 7 where *phrenes* are mentioned reveal a complex picture. First, heredity influences the nature of a person's *phrenes*. Diagoras is fortunate: his are *orthai*. Second, *phrenes* are vulnerable. Because *amplakiai* and *latha* adversely affect their function, men make mistakes. This happened to Tlepolemos, even though he was *sophos* (31), and likewise to the Heliadae, even though their *sophia* was one day to be *μείζων* (53). But even mistakes may not prove disastrous because the divine can still bring blessings: *charis* may glance at a person (11).

Diagoras with *orthai phrenes* may feel confident that Pindar's prayer for "respectful favour in the eyes of citizens and foreigners" (89) will be heard.<sup>39</sup> But Pindar ends the ode on a note of realism (94–95):

*ἐν δὲ μῆ μοῖρᾳ χρόνου  
ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοιαι διαιθύσσοισιν αὔραι.*

Things change both from good to bad and also from bad to good.<sup>40</sup> Perhaps, like Rhadmanthys who "received as his lot the faultless fruit of *phrenes*" (*Pyth.* 2.73–75), Diagoras may fare well.<sup>41</sup> Perhaps with his

<sup>37</sup> G. Fraccaroli, *Le Odi di Pindaro* (Verona 1894) 251; A. Puech, *Pindare* I (Paris 1949<sup>3</sup>) 91; Barkhuizen 26; Smith 181–82; and Defradas 46 suggest that Helios was forgotten. In contrast Norwood (above, note 2) 143 and C. A. Fennell, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Cambridge 1893) 80, suggest that Helios forgot to come. In either case a mistake on the part of god or gods is present.

<sup>38</sup> On the meaning of *alatheia* as "reality," see Becker (above, note 32) 97, note 118; Verdenius, *Commentary* 26; and Komornicka (above, note 35). Note that *τελεύταθεν* (68) may echo *ἐν τελευτῇ* (26) and *τελέθει* (53) from the other two myths. The word-echoes act as "strands" to link the myths together.

<sup>39</sup> For the translation of *αἰδοῖαν χάριν* as "respectful favour" see Verdenius, *Commentary* 30–31. Cf. other occurrences of *αἰδοῖος* in Pindar: *Ol.* 3.43; *Pyth.* 4.29; *Isth.* 2.37, and especially *Ol.* 6.76 where *αἰδοία χάρις* is mentioned and *Pyth.* 5.15–19 where an *αἰδοῖατος γέρας* is mingled with *phrên*.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Ol.* 2.33–37; *Pyth.* 3.104; *Isth.* 3.23. For these parallel passages see Becker (above, note 32) 93. The change may be good or bad: see Gildersleeve (above, note 7) 184; Fennell (above, note 37) 73; Young, *Three Odes* 99; Verdenius, *Commentary* 33, and *Mnemosyne* 29 (1976) 251. The line echoes the reference to *charis* shifting her glance from one man to another (11), as Smith 174–75 suggests. Contrast Verdenius, *Commentary* 9, who rejects this echo.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *Nem.* 7.54–60: when *Moirai* gives Thearion a "fitting opportunity for *olbos*," she does not harm the *σύνεσιν φρενῶν*.



*orthai phrenes* he can hope for good fortune (*olbos*) which does not long associate with *plagiai phrenes* (*Isth.* 3.57). Yet in a world filled with divine forces, both positive and negative, nothing is guaranteed.

This strand of thought concerning *phrenes* that runs through *Olympians* 7 acts as a link between different parts of the poem. A varied picture of *phrên/phrenes* emerges. *Phrên* produces Pindar's poem (8). *Phrenes* surrounded by *amplakiai* (24) or disturbed by *tarachai* (30) can be the cause of terrible wrong. *Phrenes* affected by *latha* can lead to mistakes (45–47). But *orthai phrenes* can also enjoin correct ways of acting (91). The strand of thought thus shows that *phrenes* strongly influence human behaviour, being themselves vulnerable to various forces. It suggests the importance that Pindar believed *phrenes* had in affecting how people act and also the wider range of factors (inheritance, divine intervention) that he believed influenced human destiny.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> My thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the grant to work on this article in Oxford and also to Professor L. Woodbury for his perceptive and helpful criticisms.